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Abstract. We propose a coalgebraic interpretation of game logic,
making the results of coalgebraic logic available for this context. We
study some properties of a coalgebraic interpretation, showing among
others that Aczel’s Theorem on the characterization of bisimilar mod-
els through spans of morphisms is valid here. We investigate also con-
gruences as those equivalences on the state space which preserve the
structure of the model.
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1. Introduction
It is well known that there is an intensive interplay between games and modal
logic, witnessed, e.g., by the work of Bonanno [2, 3], see also [7, 12]. Game
Logic [8, 14] is an approach which captures the dynamics of games very similar
to dynamic logics such as propositional dynamic logics (PDL), hereby mod-
elling the interaction of players (which are typically called Angel and Demon).
Syntactically, this is modelled through the introduction of dual games with
Angel and Demon as players.
A typical formula in game logic then would be 〈γ〉ϕ with the informal
interpretation that Angel has a strategy such that after playing γ formula ϕ
may hold; a similar interpretation is given for the formula 〈γd〉ϕ, only that in
game γ players Angel and Demon are switching their roˆles. PDL is viewed as
the fragment of this logic in which the demon is not present, and in fact it can
be shown that many properties of PDL carry over; see [8] for a discussion.
Game logic is interpreted through Kripke models. This is not particularly
surprising, given the similarities of modal logics and game logic; Kripke models
permit to translate many concepts from modal logics to game logic, carefully
delineating the differences as well. The discussions pertaining to modal logics
show that coalgebraic logics are an appropriate and very promising way of find-
ing a general unifying theory for these logics, see, e.g, Y. Venema’s survey [15]
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or [6] for a very recent collection. It would be helpful to move game logic under
this umbrella as well, if not in its entirety, then at least those parts of game
logic which can be treated coalgebraically in a sensible way.
The present note puts forward a proposal for doing just this. We look at
models for game logics as coalgebras decorated with valuations, i.e., additional
information on how to treat atomic sentences. This opens the road for game
morphisms as a way of transporting information between game models, in this
way comparing them with respect to their expressivity. Bisimulations can be
treated coalgebraically in this context as well, so that we are in a good position
to establish a variant of Aczel’s Theorem for game models. Having morphisms
available, giving the definition of congruences becomes easy (because we now
have diagrams). The logic gives us generously a congruence for free, which
actually turns out to be the coarsest congruence for a model. Taking a look at
their kernel, morphisms are shown to spawn congruences as well. Finally it is
shown that factoring a factor space does not expand the structural information:
the factor’s factor space may be obtained through a congruence on the base
space as well (this rings an algebraic bell: it is just a close cousin of the second
isomorphism theorem in group theory, adapted to the context).
The discussion is organized as follows: Section 2 follows [8] in introducing
game logics and their interpretation through Kripke models, section 3 pro-
poses a coalgebraic interpretation, and establishes that bisimilar models are
characterized through a span of morphisms. Section 4 looks at congruences
and indicates that the concept is interesting in studying game logics and their
models; section 5 wraps it all up and suggests further work.
2. The Syntax of Game Logic
We define game logic and discuss some of its properties, initially following [8,
Section 2] fairly closely. Assume that Γ0 is a set of atomic games, and that Φ0
is a set of primitive propositions; these sets are fixed for the rest of the paper.
The sets of games resp. formulas are given through this syntax
γ ::= g | ϕ? | γ; γ | γ ∪ γ | γ∗ | γd
ϕ ::= ⊥ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | 〈γ〉ϕ
with g ∈ Γ0 and p ∈ Φ0. Define as usual [γ]ϕ := ¬〈γ〉¬ϕ. The dual game γ
d is
the same as playing γ, reversing the roˆles of Angel and Demon, however, i.e.,
any choice being made by Angel is made by Demon, and vice versa.
γ1∪γ2 is interpreted as angelic choice: Angel may choose between the games
γ1 and γ2. Demonic choice is modelled through γ1 ∩ γ2 :=
(
γd1 ∪ γ
d
2
)d
. Thus
Demon chooses which subgame to play, leaving the roles of the players in the
subgames intact.
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Angelic iteration is modelled through γ∗. Thus playing γ∗, Angel may
choose how often to play γ (if at all); demonic iteration is defined as γ× :=(
(γd)∗
)d
. The game ϕ? tests whether formula ϕ holds, hence p?; γ is the game
which is played after testing whether the primitive formula p holds, and if this
is the case proceeds with γ. Because this note’s focus is coalgebraic rather
than game theoretic, we will not discuss these formulas further and refer the
reader to [8].
Given the sets Γ0 and Φ0 of atomic games resp. of atomic statements,
M =
(
S, (Eg)g∈Γ0 , V
)
is called a game model iff Eg : S → P
2(S) is a map
with Eg(s) upward closed for each s ∈ S (thus X ∈ Eg(s) and X ⊆ X
′ implies
X ′ ∈ Eg(s)) and V : Φ0 → P(S) is a map which assigns to each atomic
statement a set of states. X ∈ Eg(s) is interpreted as player Angel having a
strategy to achieve X upon playing atomic game g ∈ Γ0 in state s ∈ S [8,
Definition 2].
Each map Eg : S → P
2(S) induces a map Êg : P (S)→ P (S) upon setting
Êg(A) := {s ∈ S | A ∈ Eg(s)},
thus Êg(A) is the set of all states for which Angel has a strategy for the atomic
game g to achieve A. This map is extended inductively for games upon setting
(Êγ1;γ2)(A) :=
(
Êγ1 ◦ Êγ2
)
(A),
(Êγ1∪γ2)(A) :=
(
Êγ1 ∪ Êγ2
)
(A),
Êγd(A) := S \ Êγ(S \A),
Êγ∗(A) :=
⋃
n≥0
Êγn(A)
(here γ0 := skip with Êskip(A) := A and γ
n+1 := γn; γ). Given a model M,
one finally defines Êϕ?(A) := [[φ]]M ∩ A, where [[φ]]M := {s ∈ S | M, s |= ϕ} is
the set of states in which formula ϕ holds. This will be defined in a moment.
Note that [8] defines the semantics for the iteration as a smallest fixed point.
To be specific, for γ∗ the function A 7→ µY.A ∪ Eγ(Y ) is used, µ indicating as
usual the smallest fixed point. The reason for modifying this definition for the
present scenario is the observation that the definition given here fits smoother
into the coalgebraic scenario, given the problems with transporting fixed points
along maps.
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The relation |= is defined inductively as follows:
M, s |= ⊥ ⇔ s ∈ ∅
M, s |= p⇔ s ∈ V (p) if p ∈ Φ0
M, s |= ¬ϕ⇔M, s 6|= ϕ
M, s |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ⇔M, s |= ϕ1 or M, s |= ϕ2
M, s |= 〈γ〉ϕ⇔ s ∈ Êγ([[φ]]M).
Define for a state s ∈ S its theory in M by
ThM(s) := {ϕ |M, s |= ϕ},
so a state’s theory is just the set of all formulas which are valid in this state.
3. Game Models, Coalgebraically
Given two game models, we relate them through a morphism; this is defined
here, and we show that morphisms transport the validity of formulas. This
observation will be important for the discussion to follow. Having morphisms
available, we may use them for comparing the expressivity of models, and one
way of doing so is to ask whether they are bisimilar.
This is traditionally described through a relation on the state spaces of
the models under consideration, but morphisms permit a concise formulation
through a span; this is what Aczels’ Theorem says. We formulate this observa-
tion for the present scenario, before we show that game models may be looked
at as coalgebras. This requires, however, to identify a suitable endofunctor
F on the category of sets with maps as morphisms. This functor is used for
modelling the dynamics of a coalgebra, in this case for a game model. Recall
that an F-coalgebra (A,α) is a set A together with a morphism α : A→ F (A),
its dynamics.
Let M =
(
S, (Eg)g∈Γ0 , V
)
and M′ =
(
S′, (E′g)g∈Γ0 , V
′
)
be game models,
then f : M→M′ is called a game morphism iff f : S → S′ is a map such that
1. V (p) = f−1 [V ′(p)] for all p ∈ Φ0,
2. {f−1 [X ′] | X ′ ∈ E′g(f(s))} = Eg(s) for all states s ∈ S and all atomic
games g ∈ Γ0.
Thus s ∈ V (p) iff f(s) ∈ V ′(p) for all p ∈ Φ0 and all states s ∈ S. If upon
playing atomic game g ∈ Γ0, Angel has a strategy in model M
′ for achieving
X ′ in state f(s), then it1 has a strategy for achieving f−1 [X ′] in model M
1[8] address Angel and Demon as female. This may be politically correct, the present
author has — in view of Matthew 22:30 — some doubts, however, whether it is theologically
correct.
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in state s. And vice versa: if X ∈ Eg(s) can be achieved by Angel by playing
game g ∈ Γ0 in state s, then there exists X
′ ∈ E′g(f(s)) which Angel can achieve
in M′ in state f(s) such that X = f−1 [X ′].
Morphisms respect and reflect the validity of formulas:
Lemma 3.1. Let M1 =
(
S1, (E1,g)g∈Γ0 , V1
)
and M2 =
(
S2, (E2,g)g∈Γ0 , V2
)
be
game models, f : M1 →M2 a morphism. Then
M1, s |= ϕ⇔M2, f(s) |= ϕ
holds for each state s of M1 and each formula ϕ.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of ϕ. The induction
starts for ϕ = p ∈ Φ0, for which the assertion follows immediately from the
definition of a morphism. In the induction step, one shows first by induction
on program γ that f−1
[
Ê2,γ(X2)
]
= Ê1,γ(f
−1 [X2]) for each X2 ⊆ S2 (because
the test operator ϕ? is involved, this is part of the induction). The crucial
step is for a formula like 〈γ〉ϕ with γ a game. Under the assumption that the
assertion holds for formula ϕ, one obtains
M2, f(s) |= 〈γ〉ϕ⇔ s ∈ f
−1
[
Ê2,γ([[φ]]M2)
]
⇔ s ∈ Ê1,γ
(
f−1
[
[[φ]]M2
])
⇔ s ∈ Ê1,γ([[φ]]M1)
⇔M1, s |= 〈γ〉ϕ.
This establishes the induction step.
The decisive identity is apparently f−1
[
Ê2,γ(X2)
]
= Ê1,γ(f
−1 [X2]) for each
γ. This can be established for Êγ∗ , as defined above; it is at present not quite
clear whether this identity holds if Êγ∗ is defined as a smallest fixed point.
Game models can be compared to each other through bisimulations which
relate a step in one model to a step in the other one; we adopt [8, Definition 5]:
Definition 3.2. Let M1 =
(
S1, (E1,g)g∈Γ0 , V1
)
and M2 =
(
S2, (E2,g)g∈Γ0 , V2
)
be game models. B ⊆ S1 × S2 is called a bisimulation of M1 and M2iff for
each 〈s1, s2〉 ∈ B and each g ∈ Γ0
1. s1 ∈ V1(p) iff s2 ∈ V2(p) for each atomic statement p ∈ Φ0.
2. For all X1 ∈ E1,g(s1) there exists X2 ∈ E2,g(s2) such that for each x
′
2 ∈
X2 there exists x
′
1 ∈ X1 with 〈x
′
1, x
′
2〉 ∈ B.
3. For all X2 ∈ E2,g(s2) there exists X1 ∈ E1,g(s1) such that for each x
′
1 ∈
X1 there exists x
′
2 ∈ X2 with 〈x
′
1, x
′
2〉 ∈ B.
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This is the relational version, based on Milner’s [1] definition. Bisimula-
tions are defined in terms of a relation between the state spaces of the game
models. Handling relations may sometimes be a bit awkward. We show now
that two game models are bisimilar provided we can find a span of morphisms
between them.
Proposition 3.3. Let M1 = (S1, (E1,g)g∈Γ0 , V1) and M2 = (S2, (E2,g)g∈Γ0 , V2)
be game models. Then the following statements are equivalent
a. B ⊆ S1 × S2 is a bisimulation of M1 and M2.
b. There exists a game model B =
(
B, (Fg)g∈Γ0 ,W
)
with state space B so that
the projections pi1 : B → S1, pi2 : B → S2 are morphisms
M1 (B,
(
Fg)g∈Γ0 ,W
)pi1oo pi2 //
M2.
Proof. “a ⇒ b”: Define
Fg(s1, s2) := {D ⊆ B | pi1 [D] ∈ E1,g(s1) and pi2 [D] ∈ E2,g(s2)},
W (p) :=
(
V1(p)× V2(p)
)
∩B
for g ∈ Γ0, 〈s1, s2〉 ∈ B and p ∈ Φ0. Because both E1,g(s1) and E2,g(s2) are
upper closed, so is Fg(s1, s2) ⊆ P (B). Because B is a bisimulation,
pi−11 [V1(p)] =W (p) = pi
−1
2 [V2(p)]
holds for each p ∈ Φ0.
Now fix 〈s1, s2〉 ∈ B. Let X1 ∈ E1,g(s1), then X1 = pi1
[
pi−11 [X1]
]
, so it
suffices to show that pi2
[
pi−11 [X1]
]
∈ E2,g(s2). Given X1 there exists X2 ∈ E2,g
with the additional property that for each x2 ∈ X2 there exists x1 ∈ X1 such
that 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ B.
We claim X2 = pi2 [(X1 ×X2) ∩B] . In fact, if t ∈ pi2 [(X1 ×X2) ∩B],
then t = x2 ∈ X2 for some 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ B, hence pi2 [(X1 ×X2) ∩B] ⊆ X2.
Now let x2 ∈ X2, then there exists x1 ∈ X1 with 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ B, thus x2 ∈
pi2 [(X1 ×X2) ∩B], accounting for the other inclusion. But this implies X2 ⊆
pi2
[
pi−11 [X1]
]
, hence pi2
[
pi−11 [X1]
]
∈ E2,g(s2). This shows E1,g(s1) ⊆ {X1 ⊆
S1 | pi
−1
1 [X1] ∈ Fg(s1, s2)}.
Assume for the converse inclusion that pi−11 [X1] ∈ Fg(s1, s2), for some X1 ⊆
S1. Then pi1
[
pi−11 [X1]
]
⊆ X1. Since pi1
[
pi−11 [X1]
]
∈ E1,g(s1) by construction
of Fg, we conclude X1 ∈ E1,g(s1). Swapping the models one shows in the same
way that E2,g(s2) = {X2 ⊆ S2 | pi
−1
2 [X2] ∈ Fg(s1, s2)} holds.
Summarizing, this means that
pi1 : (B,
(
Fg)g∈Γ0 ,W
)
→M1
pi2 : (B,
(
Fg)g∈Γ0 ,W
)
→M2
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are morphisms.
“b ⇒ a”: Now assume that the projections are game morphisms. Let
〈s1, s2〉 ∈ B, and assume that s1 ∈ V1(p) for some p ∈ Φ0. Because W (p) =(
V1(p)×X2
)
∩B =
(
X1×V2(p)
)
∩B, it follows thatW (p) =
(
V1(p)×V2(p)
)
∩B,
hence we conclude s2 ∈ V2(p); similarly, we obtain s1 ∈ V1(p) from s2 ∈ V2(p).
Let X1 ∈ E1,g(s1), then Y1 := pi
−1
1 [X1] ∈ Fg(s1, s2), thus X2 := pi2 [Y1] ∈
E2,g(s2). Hence we find 〈x1, t〉 ∈ Y1 with x2 = pi2(x1, t) for x2 ∈ X2. But
x1 ∈ X1 and t = x2, so that 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ pi
−1
1 [X1] = (X1×S2)∩B, consequently,
〈x1, x2〉 ∈ B. The third property of a bisimulation is proved exactly in the same
way. Hence B is a bisimulation for M1 and M2.
Proposition 3.3 is a version of Aczel’s Theorem [9, Example 2.5] which
permits the interpretation of bisimulations in a coalgebraic setting through a
span of morphisms. This theorem says that for a set based functor F the relation
B ⊆ A × A′ is a bisimulation of two F-coalgebras (A,α) and (A′, α′) iff there
exists a coalgebra structure on B such that the projections are morphisms,
see [9] for a general discussion.
Returning to bisimulations, B ⊆ A × A′ is a bisimulation between the
coalgebras iff there exists a morphism β : B → F (B) so that the projections
are morphisms, i.e.,
(A,α) (B, β)
pioo pi
′
// (A′, α′).
This expands to a commutative diagram
A
α

B
β

pioo pi
′
// A′
α′

F (A) F (B)
F(pi)
oo
F(pi′)
// F (A′)
The transformation from a relational setting into a coalgebraic one may be
performed in the present context as well, provided we interpret game models
coalgebraically. In fact, game models may be perceived as coalgebras with
valuations for atomic statements attached. The corresponding construction
will be carried out now. Let
U(X) := {x ⊆ P (X) | x is an upper set}
be the set of all upper subsets of P(X). Thus if x ∈ U(X), then A ∈ x and
A ⊆ A′ together imply A′ ∈ x. Define for f : X → Y and for x ∈ U(X)
U(f)(x) := {B ∈ P(Y ) | f−1 [B] ∈ x},
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thus U(f) : U(X)→ U(Y ). It is easy to verify that U is an endofunctor on the
category of sets with maps as morphisms. A game modelM =
(
S, (Eg)g∈Γ0 , V
)
is perceived as an UΓ0 -coalgebra (S, %) together with a valuation V : Φ0 →
P(S), where the dynamics % : S → UΓ0(S) is defined through %(g) := Eg for
each g ∈ Γ0, operations on U
Γ0 being carried out componentwise.
Model morphisms fit into this scenario as well: model morphism f : M →
M
′ is a coalgebra morphism f : (S, %) → (S′, %′) such that f−1 [V ′(p)] =
V (p) for each p ∈ Φ0. Recall that f as a coalgebra morphism renders this
diagram commutative:
S
f //
%

S′
%′

UΓ0(S)
UΓ0 (f)
// UΓ0(S′)
Thus we have E′g ◦ f = U(f) ◦ Eg for each atomic game g ∈ Γ0.
We are poised now to reformulate Proposition 3.3 in terms of coalgebras.
Proposition 3.4. Let M1 = (S1, %1, V1) and M2 = (S2, %2, V2) be game mod-
els. Then the following statements are equivalent
a. B ⊆ S1 × S2 is a bisimulation of M1 and M2.
b. There exists a game model B = (B, β,W ) so that the projections pi1 : B →
S1, pi2 : B → S2 are morphisms. Hence this diagram commutes:
S1
%1

B
β

pi1oo pi2 // S2
%2

UΓ0(S1) U
Γ0(B)
UΓ0 (pi1)
oo
UΓ0 (pi2)
// UΓ0(S2)
Proof. Proposition 3.3.
Pausing, one might ask in view of Aczel’s theorem whether the argumen-
tation proposed here is circular: game models are coalgebras, bisimulations in
coalgebras may be expressed through cospans of projections from the bisimilar-
ity relation. This argument suggests that we do not need Proposition 3.3. But
this argument fails to address the crucial point: Definition 3.2 defines bisimi-
larity in terms of game models, and Proposition 3.3 shows that bisimilarity of
game models and bisimilarity for coalgebras manufactured from game models
are the same. Hence we need Proposition 3.3 for bringing game bisimulation
into the coalgebraic context.
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4. Congruences
Now that the coalgebraic scenario is available, we use it for defining congru-
ences and discussing two examples. We finally state and prove an isomorphism
theorem which is similar to the classical one of group theory.
If τ is an equivalence relation on set S, the equivalence class for s ∈ S is
denoted by [s]τ , the factor map is ητ , and the factor space is as usual denoted
by S/τ . Call a set A ⊆ S τ -invariant iff A is the union of τ -classes, or,
equivalently, iff s ∈ A and s τ s′ together imply s′ ∈ A. This in turn is
equivalent to A = η−1τ [ητ [A]]. Denote by A
τ :=
⋃
{[a]τ | a ∈ A} the smallest
τ -invariant subset of S which contains A.
Definition 4.1. Let M = (S, %, V ) be a game model, then an equivalence rela-
tion τ on the state space S is called a congruence for M iff
1. There exists %τ : S/τ → U
Γ0(S/τ) such that this diagram commutes
S
%

ητ // S/τ
%τ

UΓ0(S)
UΓ0 (ητ )
// UΓ0(S/τ)
2. V (p) is τ -invariant for each atomic program p ∈ Φ0.
Denote by M/τ :=
(
S/τ, %τ , Vτ
)
the factor model, where Vτ : p 7→ ητ [V (p)].
Because ητ is onto, the map %τ is uniquely determined, if it exists. Con-
sequently, ητ : M → M/τ is a game morphism. Expanding this definition, we
see that for a congruence τ and every atomic program g there exists a map
Eτ,g : S/τ → U(S/τ)
such that
Eτ,g([s]τ ) = {ητ [B] | B ∈ Eg(s)}
for all states s. In fact, Eτ,g([s]τ ) = {A ⊆ S/τ | η
−1
τ [A] ∈ Eg(s)} follows
from the definition of a morphism, so that Eτ,g([s]τ ) ⊆ {ητ [B] | B ∈ Eg(s)}.
Conversely, if B ∈ Eg(s), then B ⊆ η
−1
τ [ητ [B]] , so that the other inclusion
follows from the fact that Eg(s) is upper closed.
This characterization yields — together with the τ -invariance of the valua-
tions for the primitive programs — a concise description of a congruence. We
obtain from Proposition 3.4
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Corollary 4.2. Let τ be a congruence for game model M, then we have
M, s |= ϕ⇔M/τ, [s]τ |= ϕ.
for each formula ϕ and each state s of M. a
Game logic induces an equivalence relation ∼ on S: Two states are related
iff they have the same theories, so iff they cannot be separated by a formula.
Formally,
s ∼ s′ iff
[
M, s |= ϕ⇔M, s′ |= ϕ
]
for each formula ϕ.
This is in fact a congruence. One first notes that V (p) is ∼-invariant for each
primitive proposition p ∈ Φ0. Now define for the atomic game g ∈ Γ0 and
B ⊆ S/∼
B ∈ E∼,g([s]∼) iff {s
′ ∈ S | ∃ [s′′]∼ ∈ B : ThM(s
′) = ThM(s
′′)} ∈ Eg(s),
then the set E∼,g([s]∼) is upper closed, since Eg(s) is, and if B ∈ E∼,g([s]∼),
then B = η∼ [
⋃
B] and
⋃
B ∈ Eg(s). Moreover, if A ∈ Eg(s), then η∼ [A] ∈
E∼,g([s]∼). In fact, A may assumed to be ∼-invariant (otherwise we switch
to A∼ ∈ Eg(s)), so that we obtain {s
′ ∈ S | ∃ [s′′]∼ ∈ η∼ [A] : ThM(s
′) =
ThM(s
′′)} = A. We have shown
Proposition 4.3. The equivalence relation ∼ induced by the logic is a congru-
ence on M. a
In fact, this congruence is the largest one on a game model.
Corollary 4.4. Let τ be a congruence on game model M. Then τ ⊆∼.
Proof. Let s τ s′, then M, s |= ϕ ⇔ M, s′ |= ϕ for each formula ϕ by Corol-
lary 4.2. Hence s ∼ s′.
Let f : M → M′ be a game morphism for the game models M = (S, %, V )
and M′ = (S′, %′, V ′), and define
ker (f) := {〈s1, s2〉 | f(s1) = f(s2)},
the kernel of f . We claim that this is a congruence on M.
One first notes that each V (p) is ker (f)-invariant by the definition of a
morphism, and that
Eker(f),g([s]ker(f)) := {A
ker(f)/ker (f) | A ∈ Eg(s)}
is upper closed with B ∈ Eker(f),g([s]ker(f)) iff η
−1
ker(f)
[B] ∈ Eg(s). Consequently,
this defines a game model M/ker (f) with ηker(f) : M → M/ker (f) as a mor-
phism, so that we have established
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Proposition 4.5. Given a game model M = (S, %, V ) and an equivalence re-
lation τ on S, these properties are equivalent.
1. τ is a congruence on M.
2. There exists a model M′ and a game morphism f : M → M′ such that
τ = ker (f). a
We finally establish an isomorphism akin to the second isomorphism theo-
rem of group theory [13, par. 50].
Proposition 4.6. Let M = (S, %, V ) be a game model with a congruence τ .
Given a congruence σ on M/τ , there exists a congruence ϑ on M such that
M/ϑ is isomorphic to (M/τ)/σ.
Proof. Define s ϑ s′ iff [s]τ σ [s
′]τ for s, s
′ ∈ S, then ϑ is an equivalence relation
on S such that
Ψ :
{
S/ϑ → (S/τ)/σ
[s]ϑ 7→ [[s]τ ]σ
is a bijection. GivenX ⊆ S/ϑ, it is noted that ησ
[
ητ
[
η−1ϑ [X]
]]
∈ Eσ,τ,g
(
[[s]τ ]σ
)
iff η−1ϑ [X] ∈ Eg(s). Define
Eϑ,g([s]ϑ) := {X ⊆ S/ϑ | η
−1
ϑ [X] ∈ Eg(s)},
%ϑ(g) :=
(
t 7→ Eϑ,g(t)
)
,
Vϑ(p) := η
−1
ϑ [V (p)]
(
= η−1σ [ητV (p)]
)
.
This yields the game model M/ϑ = (S/θ, %ϑ, Vϑ) such that Ψ : M/ϑ →
(M/τ)/σ is a game morphism. Since a bijective game morphism is a game
isomorphism, the assertion follows.
The proof suggests a counterpart to the correspondence theorem of universal
algebra [4, Theorem 6.20].
Corollary 4.7. Given a congruence τ on a game model M = (S, %, V ), there
exists a bijection between the congruences on M/τ and the set of all congruences
on M which contain τ .
Proof. Let σ be a congruence on M with τ ⊆ σ, and define the equivalence
relation θ on S/τ through [s]τ θ [s
′]τ iff s σ s
′. Thus ηθ = ker (f) with f :
[s]τ 7→ [s]σ; the latter map is well defined since τ ⊆ σ. f is actually a morphism
M/τ →M/σ. In fact, consider this diagram:
S
%

ητ // S/τ
%τ

f // S/σ
%σ

UΓ0(S)
UΓ0 (ητ )
// UΓ0(S/τ)
UΓ0 (f)
// UΓ0(S/σ)
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The outer diagram and the leftmost one commute. Thus, since ητ is onto, the
rightmost diagram commutes as well. Because f is a morphism, its kernel θ is a
congruence onM/τ by Proposition 4.5. The rest of the claim is straightforward.
5. Conclusion
We propose a coalgebraic interpretation of game logic, making the results of
coalgebraic logic available. We study some properties of a coalgebraic interpre-
tation, showing among others that Aczel’s Theorem on the characterization of
bisimilar models through spans of morphisms is valid in the present scenario.
We investigate also congruences as those equivalences on the state space which
preserve the structure of the model.
The logic contains iteration, which is commonly interpreted through a small-
est fixed point (in this fashion opening an avenue to µ-calculus). We propose
using a computationally easier feasible fixed point construction which probably
does not always lead to the smallest one. The reason for doing so is the com-
patibility of the iteration construct with morphisms, a price to be paid for the
coalgebraic interpretation. We know that transporting fixed points through
maps is not a straightforward business [10, Appendix A.3], hence the relation-
ship of fixed points and morphisms should be investigated further. Given that
a coalgebraic approach is available, other interpretations may be interesting as
well: the functor governing the coalgebra is a model parameter, which can be
varied. One might think of employing M. Giry’s subprobability functor, which
then leads to stochastic game models and their various properties, parametrized
through the underlying measurable structures [11, 5].
The next step is the formulation of a coalgebraic logic along these lines.
Syntactically, this is done by replacing all modal operators by predicate liftings.
A lifting is a natural transformation which involves the functor governing the
coalgebra. As in modal logic, we say for each lifting how it is interpreted,
using the corresponding transformation. Thus a Kripke model for a coalgebraic
logic contains a set of rules for the interpretation of all its liftings. But this
is the crux of the matter. We argue in [5] that the correspondence between
modal operators and interpretation rules is somewhat incomplete due to the
fact that the operators’ semantics cannot be matched directly by the facilities
provided by the family of interpreting relations, so that some artifacts have to
be introduced. This applies a fortiori to the general coalgebraic approach. We
have a coalgebraic representation of Kripke models for game logic, but we still
have to find ways of expressing coalgebraic logics along these lines.
References
[1] P. Blackburn, M. de Rijke and Y. Venema, Modal logic, Cambridge Tracts
in Theoretical Computer Science volume 53, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge (2001).
COALGEBRAIC INTERPRETATION OF GAME LOGIC 203
[2] G. Bonanno, Branching time logic, perfect information games and backward
induction, Games Econ. Behav. 36 (2001), 57–73.
[3] G. Bonanno, Modal logic and game theory — Two alternative approaches, Risk
Decision and Policy 7 (2002), 309–324.
[4] S. Burris and H.P. Sankappanavar, A course in universal algebra, Springer,
Berlin (1981).
[5] E.-E. Doberkat, A stochastic interpretation of propositional dynamic logic:
expressivity, in the proceedings of the 4th Indian Conference on Logic and its
Applications, LNCS volume 6521, Springer, Berlin (2011), 50–64.
[6] E.-E. Doberkat and A. Kurz, Coalgebraic logic, Math. Struct. Comp. Sci.
(2010), in print.
[7] J.Y. Halpern, A computer scientist looks at game theory, Games Econ. Behav.
45 (2003), 114–132.
[8] M. Pauly and R. Parikh, Game logic — An overview, Studia Logica 75 (2003),
165–182.
[9] J.J.M.M. Rutten, Universal coalgebra: a theory of systems, Theor. Comp. Sci.
249 (2000), 3–80, special issue on modern algebra and its applications.
[10] G. Schmidt and Th. Stro¨hlein, Relations and graphs, EATCS Monographs
on Theoretical Computer Science, Springer, Berlin (1993).
[11] Ch. Schubert, Coalgebraic logic over measurable spaces: behavioral and logical
equivalence, in Y. Chen, E.-E. Doberkat and A. Jung, Proceedings of the
5th International Symposium on Domain Theory, ENTCS, Elsevier, Amsterdam
(2009), pag. 57–69.
[12] W. van der Hoek and M. Pauly, Modal logic for games and information, in
P. Blackburn, J. van Benthem, and F. Wolter, Handbook of modal logic,
Studies in Logic and Practical Reasoning volume 3, Elsevier, Amsterdam (2007),
1077–1148.
[13] B.L. van der Waerden, Algebra I, Heidelberger Taschenbu¨cher volume 12,
Springer, Berlin (1966).
[14] Y. Venema, Representation of game algebras, Studia Logica 75 (2003), 239–256.
[15] Y. Venema, Algebras and co-algebras, in P. Blackburn, J. van Benthem,
and F. Wolter, Handbook of modal logic, Studies in Logic and Practical Rea-
soning volume 3, Elsevier, Amsterdam (2007), 331–426.
Author’s address:
Ernst-Erich Doberkat
Chair for Software Technology and Faculty for Mathematics
Technische Universita¨t Dortmund
44221 Dortmund, Germany
E-mail: ernst-erich.doberkat@udo.edu
Received September 12, 2010
Revised October 30, 2010
